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Abstract 
Theoretical work on the institutional sources of economic growth regards decentralization and 
democracy in a positive light. Despite this, empirical work shows that neither fiscal 
decentralization nor national democracy is a robust predictor of per capita GDP growth. We 
argue that these theories have failed to bear fruit because they ignore the linchpin of 
decentralization and democracy, namely local democracy. Democracy at a local level enhances 
economic growth by enabling decentralized policy selection and incentivizing local politicians to 
select policies that benefit economic development, including the provision of local public goods. 
We test for the relationship using a novel measure of local democracy with global coverage and 
time series extending from 1900 to the present. We find robust evidence that local democracy 
nurtures growth. This relationship holds up when accounting for country- and year-fixed effects, 
when controlling for democracy at the national level, and when we treat our measure of local 
democracy as an endogenous regressor. Additional tests reveal that the relationship is clearer in 
contexts where our argument suggests that it should operate more strongly, namely (national-
level) democracies and in periods and regions where local-level institutions have a more 
pronounced role in policy-making. 
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Introduction 
Those who believe that institutions matter for economic performance often focus on two 
principles of institutional design. The first is decentralization, variously conceptualized as 
constitutional federalism, fiscal federalism, or local governance (Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006; Besley and Coate 2003; Faguet and Pöschl 2015; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; 
Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956; Treisman 2007; Weingast 1995). The second is democracy, variously 
understood according to electoral or liberal conceptions of that protean concept (Acemoglu, 
Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson 2015; Barzel 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2000; Gerring, 
Bond, Barndt, and Moreno 2005; Knutsen 2012; Oppenheimer and Edwards 2012; Przeworski 
et al. 2000; Wittman 1995). Yet, despite the large body of theoretical and empirical work that has 
accumulated on these subjects, scholars are not agreed upon how, whether, or under what 
conditions these institutional features affect economic performance.  
With respect to decentralization, theoretical arguments often center on the notion that 
local-level actors have better information about what constitutes the most effective policies in 
particular local contexts. Counter-arguments highlight that local actors may not have the power, 
in practice, to truly shape local policy, that local-level decision making (as national-level) may be 
associated with agency problems, and that decentralized policy-making often entails coordination 
problems at the national level that may mitigate development (see Bardhan 2002; Faguet and 
Pöschl 2015; Mookherjee 2015). Recent reviews of the empirical literature report mixed results 
(Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz 2013; Hankla 2009; Hankla and Downs 2010; Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab 2003). A meta-analysis conducted by Baskaran, Feld, and Schnellenbach (2016) 
shows that the relationship is highly sensitive to choices in specification, estimator (e.g., with or 
without country fixed-effects), and sample. Note that the panels employed in these cross-country 
analyses are centered on the OECD and include less than 75 countries. The temporal range is 
also limited, as no study extends back further than 1970 – a problematic feature when the right-
side variables of interest are sluggish. Most importantly, the concept of decentralization is usually 
operationalized as fiscal decentralization (i.e., share of total revenue or expenditure collected by 
subnational authorities), a measure that is far from perfect since subnational authorities are not 
always free to allocate revenue as they see fit. Fiscal decentralization should not be equated with 
political decentralization (Rodden 2004; White 2011).  
With respect to regime type, theories generally predict that democracies should have 
higher growth, e.g., because policy-makers should be disciplined by competitive elections to 
provide policies that benefit the wider population rather than serving the leader’s personal 
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interests. Yet, if the presumed accountability mechanisms generated by competitive national 
elections are flawed, as discussed below, national democratic leaders may not be incentivized to 
pursue growth-enhancing policies. The empirical verdict is mixed. A few recent studies find a 
positive relationship between democracy and per capita GDP growth (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2015; 
Gerring et al. 2005; Knutsen 2015). Others conclude that countries with authoritarian polities 
grow about as rapidly as democracies with similar background conditions or that the relationship 
is contingent on different contextual features and therefore highly sensitive to model 
specification (e.g., Alesina and Perotti 1997; Barro 1996; Brunetti 1997; Dawson 1999; De Haan 
and Siermann 1995a, 1995b; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008; Faust 2007; Feng 1997, 2003; 
Gasiorowski 2000; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005; Helliwell 
1994; Krieckhaus 2004; Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2002; Norris 2012; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Tavares and Wacziarg 2001).  
We argue that both decentralization and democracy depend upon the democratization of 
local institutions. Local democracy is thus the linchpin of decentralization and democracy. 
Decentralization enables local actors with informational advantages to pick the most appropriate 
policies, and free and fair elections at the local level ensure that these actors are incentivized to 
do so. Both the capacity to identify the right policies and the incentives to pursue those policies – in 
areas such as infrastructure, education, property rights protection, and business regulation – are 
requisites for economic growth. Hence, we propose that growth is enhanced when policy-
making institutions at the local level are elective and subject to robust multi-party competition. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we lay out our theoretical 
argument. Second, after briefly reviewing extant work on local democracy, we present our data 
and discuss issues of research design. This study benefits from a carefully constructed measure 
of local democracy with unprecedented global and historical coverage drawn from the Varieties 
of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2016). Third, we conduct crossnational panel 
regressions that employ measures of decentralization, democracy, and local democracy as 
predictors of growth. These analyses show that only the latter is a robust predictor of subsequent 
economic performance. Fourth, we expose the relationship between local democracy and growth 
to a variety of additional tests. Fifth, we examine alternate measures of local (and subnational) 
democracy. Sixth, we interrogate the relationship between local democracy and growth in 
specific institutional, geographic, and temporal contexts. And finally, we summarize our findings 
and point the way to future research. 
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I. Theory 
In the search to identify “good institutions” theories of decentralization have centered on 
national/subnational relationships while theories of democracy have centered on national-level 
institutions. Our theory combines elements of both, centering on local democracy. This is defined 
as a setting in which the most important policy-making bodies at subnational levels are chosen 
through free and fair elections.1 
The argument builds on three assumptions: (1) political decentralization is very hard to 
achieve, in practice, without local democracy; (2) policies selected at the local level matter for 
growth; and (3) local democracy establishes local-level accountability, which incentivizes local 
politicians to provide public goods. We discuss these assumptions, in sequence, before 
summarizing the empirical implications that follow from the argument. 
(1) Political decentralization is generally understood as the devolution of political power 
from center to periphery, which entails the possibility for local actors to select policies in various 
areas.2 Yet the ideal of political decentralization is difficult to achieve, in practice, even if the 
rights of subnational actors are constitutionally guaranteed and they possess revenue-raising 
authority. Officials at the center may incentivize local actors by promising monetary rewards to 
localities that follow their lead; they may utilize legal precedents to reinterpret constitutional 
principles; and they may reward loyalty with higher-level appointments. Typically, the central 
government, or its agents (e.g., a dominant party), controls the fates of ambitious politicians and 
bureaucrats. In this circumstance it matters little what constitutional, statutory, or fiscal policies 
are in effect. If subnational officeholders are beholden to national officeholders there will be 
very tenuous or little effective decentralization of power, as, for instance, the experiences of 
“political recentralization” in Russia under Putin illustrates (Konitzer and Wegren 2006).  
To counter the centripetal force of central government, local institutions must have local 
ballast. Local democracy serves this function, for elective officials are then accountable to a local 
electorate, whose concerns may be quite different from leaders at the center, or from the 
                                                
1 We focus on local-level (county or municipal) institutions rather than regional-level (state, territory, länder) 
institutions, as we regard the former as more important in most contexts – though perhaps not in federal nation-
states. In our empirical analysis we do test indices incorporating characteristics of regional entities and evaluate the 
relative importance of democracy at the regional and local levels in enhancing growth. 
2 Of course, if the center is very weak – at the limit, a failed state – then power is devolved by default. This is 
abdication, not decentralization, and is unlikely to foster economic prosperity, as suggested by literature on the 
performance of weak or failed states (Acemoglu 2005; Bates 2008). Political decentralization implies that power is 
willfully granted from center to periphery and could be retrieved if the central government mustered its full strength. 
Brakes on the central government are thus political (as in the United States), not military (as in present-day Somalia). 
We therefore assume that the central government enjoys an effective monopoly on coercion and can overcome 
coercive apparatuses wielded by subnational units. 
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national electorate. 3  Thus, we conclude that significant decentralization of policy-making 
responsibilities is difficult to achieve unless local democracy is in place.  
(2) Political decentralization can matter for economic development, as it provides local 
policy makers with influence over decision-making in areas that critically shape the expected 
incomes, costs and risks for workers, investors, and entrepreneurs. This includes activities that 
affect entry and competition between businesses, such as implementing zoning and building 
regulations, and providing public goods and services such as primary and secondary education, 
health care, sanitation, public assistance, law and order, controlling small-scale corruption, and 
regulation of property rights (Dickovick 2011; Haider-Markel 2014). 
Policies in some of these areas, including education, have a fairly direct impact on human 
capital, which growth economists consider a key determinant of (at least) medium-run growth 
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Acemoglu 2009). While national governments may determine 
the broad outlines of education policy, local governments often run the schools. Their actions 
affect the provision of school equipment, the quality of buildings, and the hiring of teachers 
(Haider-Markel 2014). These aspects of the education system are critical for education quality (see, 
e.g., Stasavage 2005), which is a more important determinant of human capital than, e.g., the 
number of years that kids stay in school (e.g., Hanushek & Woessmann 2008, 2012; Jamison, 
Jamison, and Hanushek 2007). Other policies  implemented at the local level, pertaining for 
example to monitoring property rights and controlling corruption, affect physical capital 
investment (North 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1993), another key determinant of medium-term 
growth (Solow 1956; Acemoglu 2009).4 It is therefore plausible to suppose that the capacity of 
local governments to, e.g., select effective regulatory policies and deliver public goods influences 
a country’s per capita growth over the long-term. 
While the policy-making role of local government is not incidental anywhere, which 
policy areas are (largely) the responsibility of national-level and local-level legislation obviously 
varies among countries. Many nation states have taken on greater roles over time, and 
particularly after World War II, in policy areas such as social welfare legislation, education, and 
large-scale infrastructure investments (e.g., Lindert 2004), leaving less room for local policy 
initiatives. Yet, the comprehensiveness (and effectiveness) of national legislative initiatives still 
varies considerably across regions. We expect that that local-level institutions are particularly 
                                                
3 Yet, the centripetal forces of national government are presumably stronger – and hence more difficult for locally 
elected officials to counter – where national leaders are very powerful and less concerned about the preferences of 
local electorates. As we hypothesize below, the presence of local democracy may therefore be less effective in 
ensuring true political decentralization in (national-level) autocracies. 
4 The influence of local governance on investment is shown, e.g., by Knutsen et al. (2016), who find that mining 
companies in sub-Saharan Africa prefer to locate in communities where corruption is (initially) low, and that mining 
subsequently increases local economic growth, at least in the medium term. 
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important for growth in times and places – e.g., Europe and North America prior to the 
twentieth century (Somanathan 2001) or in present-day sub-Saharan Africa (Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan 1997) – where the national government is less engaged in the provision of 
public goods, thus leaving more room for local policy initiatives. 
(3) The above discussion suggests that policies that can be – and often are – selected at 
the local level matter for economic development. Nonetheless, even if local policy-makers are 
able to choose the most appropriate education reform or investment policy for their municipality, 
there is no guarantee that they will want to pursue it. Placing power in the hands of local officials 
is not productive unless these officials are properly incentivized to pursue growth-enhancing 
policies. What is more, the various benefits claimed for decentralization, e.g., by the theory of 
fiscal federalism (Oates 1972), depend upon assumptions that are only plausible if some degree 
of local-level accountability is in place. For example, a key premise of fiscal federalism is that 
wherever a population is characterized by heterogeneity, overall utility is maximized when lower-
level governments enjoy autonomy to set policies in accordance with local preferences. This 
seems plausible insofar as lower-level governments are responsive to local preferences. And this, 
in turn, presumes a mechanism of local accountability.  
We surmise that well-functioning elections with multiple candidates vying for power and 
free-and-fair competition are critical in this regard. Here, we rely on standard models of 
accountability under democratic systems (Ashworth 2012; Ferejohn 1986), which suggest that 
competitive elections discipline incumbent politicians – whose desire to keep their jobs is 
contingent on the goodwill of voters – to select policies that benefit the broader community, 
rather than pursue narrow rent-seeking policies or outright theft.  
Such mechanisms presume that voters are well informed, because only then can they 
properly evaluate the performance of politicians and reward or punish them accordingly (e.g., 
Harding 2015).5 A vast literature focusing on the national level highlights how asymmetric 
information may undermine accountability links between leaders and voters, even in the 
presence of multi-party competition, a (e.g., Besley 2005). To the extent that mechanisms of 
accountability presume the ability of the electorate to monitor, and thereby discipline, the 
behavior of politicians, the principle of electoral accountability could be easier to achieve at local 
than at national levels, especially provided that local elections are fairly free and fair (features that 
                                                
5 One need not assume universal suffrage for mechanisms of accountability to work at the local level (although 
naturally it will affect whom they work for). There are many examples of regimes at the local level that were 
accountable to a minority of adult residents in that locality. The key issue, in our view, is that electors are far more 
numerous than the officials they select, numerous enough that they cannot be compensated indefinitely through 
rent-seeking. The pie must also grow in order for this sizeable electorate to prosper (though this does not preclude a 
degree of rent-seeking). 
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are explicitly measured and incorporated in our index of local democracy below). There are two 
main reasons why accountability mechanisms may work fairly well at the local level, and perhaps 
better than at national levels.6  
First, the smaller scale of local politics should alleviate informational and collective action 
problems that weaken accountability. The relative transparency of smaller communities may 
mitigate moral hazard problems by making the actions of local politicians easier to track than the 
actions of national politicians located in the capital. Further, personal knowledge of local 
candidates should also help mitigate adverse selection problems by making it easier for voters to 
discern which candidates are honest, less corrupt, or simply more effective leaders. While 
democratic elections at the national level can also allow for selecting “good leaders” (see Besley 
and Reynal-Querol 2011), the closer contact and relations between voters and politicians at the 
local level may further mitigate the selection of “bad” politicians due to information problems. 
The smaller scale of local politics could also make it easier for citizens to allay collective action 
problems also in between elections, enabling them to organize and put pressure on politicians to 
enact policies that are in the interest of the wider community. Second, neighboring municipalities 
provide a fairly clear reference point by which economic performance can be benchmarked. 
Comparing the performance of neighboring municipalities is presumably more straightforward 
than comparing the performance of neighboring countries, and such comparisons serve as an 
important cue for voters in evaluating the behavior of politicians (Powell and Whitten 1993). In 
support of this perspective, Khemani (2001) investigates voting behavior in national and local 
elections in India and finds that voters are generally more vigilant in monitoring local 
governments. 
Taken together, our argument suggests that local democracy facilitates local 
accountability, incentivizing politicians to provide public goods such as well-functioning 
infrastructure, high-quality education, and regulatory policies that attract investment. We 
recognize that free and fair elections are not sufficient to assure that accountability mechanisms 
are in place. Democratic institutions may be subverted by local capture (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000), which may, in turn, be facilitated by, for instance, high economic inequality 
(Ziblatt 2008). Nor does the absence of local democracy preclude the provision of public goods 
(Tsai 2007). However, as a general rule we expect that accountability, and thus, e.g., the 
                                                
6 This does not necessarily mean that accountability always decreases in the size of the political unit. There may be 
countervailing mechanisms contributing to higher accountability in modestly sized (e.g., large municipalities) than in 
very small units. For instance, Gerring et al. (2015) show that districts with larger electorates “mechanically” induce 
greater multi-party/candidate contestation, which may enhance accountability. 
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provision of public goods, varies with the robustness of local democracy (Blair 2000; Crook and 
Manor 1998; Echeverri-Gent 1993).  
Our theoretical discussion suggests one principal implication – that local democracy 
should foster improved economic performance – and two subsidiary hypotheses about contexts 
that might favor this relationship. First, local democracy should have greater impact on growth 
in contexts where local governments have considerable autonomy (vis-à-vis the national 
government). We surmise, therefore, that under national regimes where the leader’s powers are 
constrained and where multiparty competition is accepted and shapes the incentives of leaders, 
local democracy will have a stronger growth effect. Second, local democracy should have greater 
impact on growth in contexts where it enjoys a preeminent policy-making role (vis-à-vis the 
national government), i.e., prior to World War II in advanced industrial countries (Somanathan 
2001) and after World War II in newly established states, e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
presence of the central state is often weak especially in the provinces (Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 1997). 
 
II. Research Design 
In the introduction we reviewed national-level studies of (national) democracy and 
decentralization, noting that empirical results are inconclusive. Also germane to our topic are 
studies where regions or cities serve as units of analysis. In particular, several historical studies 
show that local areas with autonomy or limited government in the pre-modern era enjoy higher 
social capital, better governance, and/or stronger economic performance in subsequent centuries 
(Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden 2013; Giuliano and Nunn 2013; Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2008; Jacob 2010; but, see Abramson and Boix 2014). This offers some grist for our 
theory, even though it pertains to a very different historical era and utilizes concepts and 
measures that fit loosely upon the theory sketched in Section I. 
Local-level studies on the contemporary era are generally more limited in scope, focusing 
on a single country or a small handful of countries (e.g., Crook and Manor 1998; Levy 1999; 
Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee 2004). One study of the introduction of local democracy in China 
suggests that local areas with elective governments enjoy stronger institutions and more public 
goods (Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel, Qian, and Yao 2014). A study of local governments in 
Brazil finds significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors are eligible for reelection 
(Ferraz and Finan 2011). However, Gèlineau and Remmer (2006) find mixed results regarding 
decentralization and the match between citizen preferences and the allocation of public 
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resources in Argentina. Likewise, Moricz and Sjöholm (2014) examine the effect of the staggered 
introduction of local elections in Indonesia and find no effect on subsequent economic growth 
across districts. 
 Our theoretical interest is at the polity level. Specifically, we ask whether local-level 
democracy enhances national economic growth. This is not a question that can be answered 
definitively with subnational data. First, the scope for within-country analysis is, in practice, 
limited. In the modern era, most countries introduce local democracy in a uniform manner 
(across all districts at once), leaving little opportunity for analyses that are disaggregated at the 
subnational level. China and Indonesia are unusual in this regard, and it is questionable whether 
one may generalize from their experience to the experience of other countries. Indeed, our 
argument provides strong reasons to suppose that the aggregate impact of local democracy on 
growth depends upon contextual factors that are not apparent when countries are evaluated in 
isolation. Second, direct measures of municipal-level economic growth – our dependent variable 
of interest – are hard to come by. And, even for the few countries that do have municipal-level 
estimates of growth, such as Brazil, time-series are very short.  
A third problem with subnational analysis of this question involves interference across 
local-level units. Consider that municipalities with greater autonomy and/or democracy may 
prosper by attracting physical capital and human capital from surrounding areas that are less 
autonomous and/or less democratic. If so, the impact of local institutions is primarily 
redistributive – shifting growth from one area to another – rather than aggregative. Alternatively, 
if there are strong and positive economic spill-over effects via trade or increased demand from 
citizens in neighboring municipalities, improvements in local democracy in one municipality may 
generate growth benefits in a wider geographic area. In other words, one cannot assume that 
municipality-level relationships aggregate up to national levels because of violations of the stable 
unit treatment value assumption. 
For these reasons, it is vital to complement existing subnational studies with a 
comprehensive national-level analysis of the relationship between local democracy and economic 
performance. To our knowledge, no such analysis has ever been conducted, although there is 
some cross-national evidence of a connection between local democracy and public goods 
provision, proxied by educational attainment.7 The major innovation of the present study is to 
                                                
7 In a recent working paper, Ponce-Rodrigues et al. (2016) argue that the combination of elective subnational 
governments and party centralization (i.e., the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-
national office) leads to enhanced educational attainment. This is tested in a panel analysis of 125 countries across 
twenty-five years. We replicate this result in Appendix A using our novel measure of local democracy and measures 
of average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013), supporting the notion that local democracy enhances 
education. 
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measure local democracy in a consistent fashion across countries and over time, enabling the 
first systematic cross-national test of local democracy as a factor in economic growth. 
A Local Democracy Index 
To operationalize the concept of local democracy we draw on three variables from the recently 
completed Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016). These variables 
measure whether local governments are elected (v2ellocelc), whether sub-national elections are 
generally free and fair (v2elffelr), and the power of elected local offices relative to non-elected 
local offices (v2ellocpwr). All three indicators are re-scaled from 0-1 and then multiplied together 
to form a Local Democracy Index (LDI).8  
The intuition behind this multiplicative aggregation scheme is that complementarities 
exist across the three components (see Munck 2009). Specifically, in order for local democracy 
to be fully established three conditions must be satisfied: there must be local elections, these 
elections must be free and fair, and officials selected in these elections must be preeminent 
relative to other (unelected) local-level officials. If any of these conditions fails entirely (signified 
by a zero score on at least one component variable), the concept of local democracy is fatally 
undermined. For example, local multi-party elections do not matter if the elected officials have 
no power and say, whatsoever, over policy decisions. If all conditions are satisfied to some extent 
(possessing non-zero values) then the quality of local democracy is regarded as having a positive 
(non-zero) value. 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution in LDI globally from 1900 to 2012, displaying mean as 
well as 5, 25, 75, and 95 percentile scores for each year. As suggested by the modest change in 95 
percentile scores, from about .50 in 1900 to about .65 in 2012, countries with high levels of local 
democracy have existed throughout the period. Nonetheless, the sharper increase in 75 
percentile scores, from about .15 in 1900 to about .45 in 2012, signifies that more countries have 
at least decent levels of local democracy today than a century ago. Increases in the 75 percentile 
and mean LDI scores were particularly pronounced right after World War II and from the 1980s 
to the mid-2000s (after which there has been stagnation). These statistics also suggest that local 
democracy was in decline in the 1930s and early 1940s. 
                                                
8 For methodological considerations pertaining to V-Dem data in general, see Pemstein et al. (2015). McMann, who 
was responsible for creating the indicators, provide a more specific discussion of the indicators entering LDI, 
including a careful evaluation of their reliability and validity (McMann 2016). McMann (2016) also sets forth the V-
Dem index of local democracy. This index combines (a) whether local government is elected (v2ellocelc) and (b) the 
power of elected local offices relative to non-elected local offices (v2ellocpwr) – but does not incorporate whether 
sub-national elections are generally free and fair (v2elffelr). McMann’s index and our own are highly correlated 
(r=.956) and generate fairly similar results when tested in our benchmark model, as displayed in Table 3. 
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Figure 2 displays histograms over LDI for different regions in the year 2000 (histograms 
for 1900 and 1950 are shown in Appendix A). Most regions display substantial cross-country 
variation. In Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, seven countries scored below .05 on 
LDI and seven others above .45. The variation was also quite substantial in Latin America and in 
Asia and the Pacific. In the composite Western “region” scores were generally high, as only 
Cyprus and Israel score below .50, and only Turkey and Iran scored higher than .10 among the 
MENA countries. 
 
Figure 1:  Average LDI and variation in LDI, globally, over time. 
 
 
Notes: Solid line represents mean LDI score globally, solid spikes range from 25 percentile to 75 percentile 
observation in given year, and dashed spikes range from 5 percentile to 95 percentile observation in given year. 
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Figure 2:  Histograms of LDI by major world regions  
 
 
 
Benchmark specification 
To test the relationship between local democracy and growth we adopt a panel format that 
extends across all sizeable sovereign countries from 1900 to the present. The baseline sample 
includes roughly 10,000 country-year observations from about 150 countries. The dependent 
variable is the annual growth of real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, drawn from the Maddison 
Project (Bolt and van Zanden 2014).  
The benchmark specification includes (log) GDP per capita level (also from Bolt and van 
Zanden 2014) to account for conditional convergence effects (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). 
This specification also includes country dummies – a fixed-effects framework – in order to 
control for stable, unit-specific features that may serve as confounders. We also include year 
dummies to control for global temporal patterns in growth and local democracy.  
The benchmark model adopts an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with robust 
standard errors clustered by country in order to handle serial autocorrelation. Right-side variables 
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are lagged three periods (i.e., three years) behind the outcome. This follows Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008), who suggest that democratization is often associated with short-term turmoil 
and uncertainty, culminating in a new equilibrium about three years later. Likewise, the pathway 
we have conjectured – through electoral accountability and the implementation of growth-
enhancing policies – presumably requires some time to reach fruition. Since precise expectations 
about the length of the lag are impossible to infer on theoretical grounds, we explore alternate 
lag specifications in additional tests. 
The resulting baseline model is fairly sparse so as to mitigate risks of post-treatment bias. 
Robustness tests incorporate a larger set of covariates, such as population size, urbanization, civil 
war, natural resources and land inequality, in order to mitigate risks of omitted-variable bias – 
but with the risk of introducing post-treatment bias. 
 
III. Initial Tests 
Model 1 in Table 1, the benchmark model, reveals a coefficient for LDI that is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. The point estimate suggests that an improvement in local 
democracy from the lowest (0) to the highest value registered in our sample (0.83; Germany in 
the most recent years) would enhance a country’s per capita growth rate by 1.7 percentage points. 
Accordingly, differences in local democracy are predicted to give substantial differences in level 
of development over time. If two countries begin with identical per capita incomes but maintain 
divergent LDI scores (at either extreme), the country with high LDI will become twice as 
wealthy after about 40 years.  
 We return to further tests of this relationship in the next section. But first – in order to 
put these results into perspective and to replicate extant work on decentralization and democracy, 
reviewed at the outset – we present a series of tests focused on the latter concepts.  
To operationalize decentralization, we first adopt a common fiscal measure of that 
concept: the share of general revenue raised at subnational levels, compiled by Enikolopov and 
Zhuravskaya (2007). As our introductory review noted, there are empirical indications that fiscal 
decentralization correlates with growth. Yet, the limited cross-country coverage and modest time 
series of available measures means that it is difficult to identify effects in more demanding 
designs that account for country- and year-fixed effects. This is illustrated also by our benchmark 
specification, Model 2 in Table 1. With 98 countries (a number that is markedly higher than in 
extant studies) and a maximum of 29 years, the positive coefficient on fiscal decentralization fails 
to achieve significance at conventional levels with a t-value of 1.6.  
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Granted, our benchmark specification provides a fairly strict test by controlling for both 
country- and year-fixed effects, and less demanding specifications may yield somewhat stronger 
indications of a relationship. This point is illustrated by Model 3, in which the year dummies are 
replaced by a cubic polynomial time trend (following Carter and Signorino 2010). Here, we find 
a similarly sized coefficient (0.04) that is weakly significant at 10 percent. Model 4 employs a 
different measure of decentralization, focused on formal-political arrangements, i.e., federalism. 
Gerring and Thacker (2008) measure countries as non-federal (0), semi-federal (1), or federal 
(2).9 While Model 4 includes 129 countries and maximum timespan of 103 years, the association 
between federalism and growth does not surpass conventional statistical thresholds of 
significance (and this result is actually weakened when we use a cubic time trend instead of year 
dummies). These tests suggest that the empirical relationship between decentralization and 
growth is weak, at best. 
                                                
9 While this measure is ordinal, we retain our benchmark OLS model to ease comparisons across measures. 
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Table 1:  Initial Tests 
 Local democracy Decentralization National democracy Horse-race tests 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
LDI 2.06**        1.85* 3.44*** 2.54* 
 
2.09        1.88 3.25 1.96 
Fiscal decentralization 
 
0.04 0.04*         
 1.58 1.68         
Federalism   0.37     0.35  0.47* 
   1.35     1.23  1.80 
Polyarchy    0.32 1.48*    -1.98** -1.70* 
    0.39 1.87    -2.22 -1.77 
Polity2      -0.01     
 
     -0.24     
BMR       -0.14    
 
      -0.54    
Ln GDP per capita -2.84*** -6.95*** -7.34*** -3.95*** -2.54*** -2.86*** -2.84*** -2.94*** -3.97*** -2.81*** -4.14*** 
 -6.61 -4.46 -4.84 -6.31 -6.78 -7.39 -7.19 -7.39 -6.29 -6.32 -6.23 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Cubic time trend   Y 
  
Y 
   
 
 
N 9231 1316 1316 4840 9693 9693 10354 10181 4693 8950 4587 
Countries 149 98 98 129 152 152 155 153 125 149 125 
Max years 108 29 29 103 108 108 208 107 103 108 103 
R2 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per 
capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. Independent variables are measured three years before dependent variable. Country dummies, year dummies, cubic time polynomials and 
constant are omitted. !
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We turn now to the relationship between national-level democracy and growth. To 
measure democracy we employ the Polyarchy index from V-Dem (Teorell et al. 2016), the 
Polity2 index from Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2014), and the dichotomous “BMR” measure from 
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013). Model 5, our benchmark model, uses Polyarchy, which ranges 
from 0–1 and includes indicators on whether or not the chief executive is (directly or indirectly) 
elected, the extent to which national elections are “clean”, the freedoms of association and 
speech, and suffrage extension. Hence, Polyarchy is an electoral democracy measure (as is our 
LDI measure of local democracy) that mainly caters to the conditions for elite competition 
through multi-party elections at the national level. Polyarchy is positive, but far from significant 
at conventional levels, suggesting no clear effect of national-level democracy on growth. When 
year dummies are replaced with a cubic time trend, as shown in Model 6, the relationship 
becomes weakly significant.  
This reflects the more general pattern that we find when we test various model 
specifications and measures of democracy at the national level. Some models suggest a positive 
relationship between democracy and growth, but this hinges on specification choices. More 
specifically, models including country- and year-fixed effects simultaneously do not yield any 
clear results. This is illustrated in Models 7 and 8, which are versions of our baseline model where 
Polyarchy is replaced by, respectively, Polity2 (which in addition to electoral aspects includes 
checks placed on the chief executive) and BMR (a dichotomous, electoral democracy measure). 
In sum, we replicate the findings of most extant studies (cited at the outset), which show no 
robust association between democracy at the national level and economic growth.  
The final section of Table 1 displays “horse-race” regression tests, in which LDI and 
measures of decentralization (federalism) and/or democracy (Polyarchy) are included together in 
the benchmark model, allowing us to distinguish the impact of various institutional features. (We 
do not focus on fiscal decentralization here because of the poorer data coverage.) In particular, 
we need to ensure that the positive estimate for LDI is not simply a product of omitted variable 
bias stemming from differences in national-level democracy or decentralization. This seems not 
to be the case, as LDI retains its size and remains at least weakly significant in all specifications.10 
Regarding the relationship between national-level democracy and growth, Polyarchy actually 
turns negative and significant at 5 percent when we account for level of local democracy in 
                                                
10 This holds also more generally when LDI is combined with the other measures of democracy (Appendix Table 
B.2). It does not hold when LDI is combined with the fiscal decentralization measure, restricting the sample to only 
1260 country-year observations from the most recent decades. As theorized, and shown empirically below, the 
relationship between LDI and growth is weaker in recent decades than previously. 
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Model 10.11 We also note that the federalism index turns weakly significant in the three-way 
horse race in Model 11.12 
The inclusion of another V-Dem measure than LDI (Polyarchy) in the rightmost 
columns of Table 1 also addresses a concern that coders for the V-Dem project may unwittingly 
judge a country’s institutions by its economic performance – granting higher scores to countries 
with higher growth rates, and thus generating circularity between left- and right-side measures. If 
this sort of coding bias were in evidence, we would expect it to manifest itself for other V-Dem 
measures. (We also included other V-Dem indices such as party institutionalization and executive 
corruption in horse-race tests, with no change in the findings reported here.). Indeed, we might 
expect a country’s growth rate to have greater impact on coding for national institutions than for 
local institutions, and Models 5-6 reveal scant evidence of coding circularity with respect to 
democratic institutions at the national level. And when Polyarchy is included along with LDI in 
the horse-race test of Model 10, the estimate for LDI is even stronger than in our benchmark 
model. In sum, initial tests suggest a positive relationship between local democracy and 
subsequent economic growth, and little evidence for a direct growth effect from conventional 
measures of decentralization and national-level democracy. 
 
IV. Robustness Tests 
To probe the robustness of the relationship between LDI and growth we test several additional 
models, as shown in Table 2 (see also Appendix B). Model 1 replicates the benchmark 
specification from Table 1. Model 2 adopts the alternative strategy for modeling time-dependence 
using cubic polynomial time trends rather than annual dummies. After doing so, the point 
estimate increases by 60 percent relative to the benchmark (to 3.3), and the t-value by 50 percent 
(to 3.1). 
Model 3 adjusts on the baseline by including a lagged dependent variable (growth 
measured three years prior) to control for persistence in growth rates affecting results. The 
results barely move relative to the benchmark, and LDI remains significant at 5 percent. We 
                                                
11 This result is not robust to small specification changes, as Polyarchy is insignificant at all conventional levels when, 
e.g., year dummies are substituted with cubic time polynomials or when controls such as log population and 
urbanization are added. Hence, we caution against interpreting this finding as evidence of a negative direct effect of 
national-level democracy on growth. Still, Polyarchy consistently drops in absolute size whenever we add LDI to the 
regression, suggesting a possible (positive) indirect effect of national-level democracy on growth via local democracy. 
As we discuss in the concluding section, this hinges on the assumption that national-level democracy determines 
local democracy, and not the other way around, and we leave further investigation of this intriguing relationship for 
future research. 
12 Unlike the local democracy result, this finding is sensitive to minor specification changes, such as substituting year 
dummies with the cubic time trend. 
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tested models including several additional lags, both backwards in time as well as growth 
measured between t-3 and t, and the result is very stable (Appendix Table B.3). To investigate 
whether persistence in LDI drives the results, Model 4 substitutes LDI with change in LDI from 
t-3 to t-2 and predicts that improvements in local democracy are clearly linked (t=2.6) to higher 
subsequent growth. 
Our baseline model is quite sparse, and one might be concerned that the relationship is 
driven by omitted variable bias despite the inclusion of country- and year-fixed effects. Model 5, 
Table 2 therefore adds controls for (log) population level and urbanization rate to account for 
two plausible sources of omitted variable bias. The size (and growth) of the population has been 
highlighted by different growth economists as an important determinant of growth, albeit with 
different directions on the predicted effect (cf., Solow 1956; Romer 1990), and local democracy 
is also correlated with the size of the country.13 Further, urban economies are associated with a 
different sectoral composition than agrarian, and may allow for increased growth through 
“agglomeration effects” (e.g., Krugman 1991). Urbanized countries also tend to score higher on 
LDI, according to our data. Nonetheless, controlling for urbanization and population size in 
Model 5 only reduces LDI from 2.1 to 1.8, and it remains significant at 10 percent. 
Model 6 expands on Model 5 by adding three more variables that capture different factors 
that may affect growth and correlate with LDI, namely conflict, natural resources and inequality 
(see also Appendix Table B.4). More specifically, Model 6 includes fuel income per capita (scaled 
to per 1000 capita) and a dummy for civil war, both taken from Haber and Menaldo (2011). It 
finally includes the Family Farms measure from Vanhanen (2000) to account for differences in 
agricultural production and inequality. LDI increases to 2.8 when these controls are added and 
obtains a t-value of 2.3.14 
                                                
13 Nonetheless, Przeworski et al. (2000) argue and find that regime type affects population growth rates, and 
controlling for population variables might thus introduce post-treatment bias. 
14 Further tests reveal that the increase in LDI coefficient relative to the benchmark is due to the reduced sample 
size (6194 obs. instead of 9231), which comes from missing values on the control variables. 
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Table 2:  Robustness Tests 
 OLS Fixed Effects Models with 1-year panels System GMM models with 5-year panels 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
LDI 2.06** 3.28*** 1.96**  1.77* 2.76** 2.98*** 1.17 3.39** 3.42*** 3.43*** 3.27** 
 
2.09 3.13 2.05  1.77 2.26 2.71 1.49 2.43 2.34 2.58 2.15 
  LDI    5.83**         
    2.59         
Ln GDP per capita -2.84*** -3.16*** -2.81*** -2.73*** -3.07*** -3.99*** -2.34*** -2.55*** -0.95** -0.83** -0.90*** -0.77** 
 
-6.61 -7.22 -6.53 -6.75 -6.23 -7.08 -5.66 -7.41 -2.57 -2.14 -2.92 -2.05 
Ln Population 
 
   -1.61*** -2.08*** 
      
  
   -3.42 -4.45 
      
Urbanization 
 
   -0.35 -1.28 
      
  
   -0.14 -0.47 
      
Civil War 
 
   
 
-1.50*** 
      
  
   
 
-2.95 
      
Fuel income per thousand capita 
 
   
 
-0.30** 
      
  
   
 
-2.14 
      
Family farms 
 
   
 
0.01 
      
  
   
 
0.74 
      
First LDV (lag ec. growth) 
 
 0.05***  
    
0.16 0.15 0.15*** 0.17** 
  
 2.96  
    
1.38 1.08 2.73 2.15 
Second LDV (lag ec. growth) 
 
   
    
 -0.02   
  
   
    
 -0.43   
Country dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y     
Year dummies Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cubic time trend  Y           
Growth measured at t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3 t+1 t+10 t+5 t+5 t+5 t+5 
N 9231 9231 9126 9212 8952 6194 9554 8140 1696 1597 1696 1696 
! 21!
Countries 149 149 149 149 144 138 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Max years/5-year panels 108 108 108 108 108 99 110 101 21 21 21 21 
R2 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11     
AR(2) test 
 
   
    
.30 .37 .15 .15 
Ar(3) test 
 
   
    
.39 .38 .39 .39 
Hansen J-test 
 
   
    
.17 .20 .91 .61 
Treated as endogenous    LDI LDI LDI+LDV LDI+LDV 
Lags used for instruments         2-4 2-4 2-4 3-4 
Instruments (N) 
 
   
    
94 94 175 135 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. All OLS models are 
estimated with robust errors clustered by country, and all GMM models with robust errors. All variables are calculated as moving averages in the 5-year panels. Country dummies, year dummies and 
constant are omitted. 
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In Models 7 and 8, we experiment with different lag lengths than our baseline 3-year lag. 
Results are fairly stable as long as the lag length does not exceed 10 years (see also Appendix 
Table B.5). Model 7 shows that LDI is highly significant for a shorter (1-year) lag than the 
baseline specification. Model 8 illustrates that the relationship weakens when the lag length 
increases substantially (to 10 years), although the coefficient is still fairly sizeable (1.2) and the t-
value is 1.5. These tests suggest that the relationship between local democracy and growth is 
fairly proximal. One plausible reason for this is suggested by our argument on local democracy-
inducing policies – including in the realm of education, healthcare, and business regulation – that 
should largely affect human capital and physical capital. These features are by many growth 
economists argued to only affect medium-term growth (e.g., Mankiw et al. 1992), in contrast 
with technological change, which affects also long-term growth.  
Nonetheless, when growth is measured before local democracy, there is no positive 
relationship whatsoever. To exemplify, when growth is measured in t-1 in the baseline (with local 
democracy measured in t) the LDI coefficient is negatively signed (though insignificant at all 
conventional levels). Further, Granger-type causality tests (see Appendix Table B.6) – predicting 
LDI with lagged growth, controlling for lagged LDI– actually suggest that higher growth predicts 
lower scores on LDI. These tests partly assuage concerns that the positive LDI coefficient in our 
baseline model is driven by growth causing higher levels of local democracy. 
However, utilizing the time dimension and conducting Granger tests is not a bulletproof 
strategy for dealing with potential endogeneity biases, and nor is including a control for the level 
of income as well as country- and year-fixed effects (though they surely help). Unfortunately, 
identifying valid instruments for local democracy that are both strong and satisfy the exclusion 
restriction is difficult.  
As a next-best expedient, we employ Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that treat 
LDI as an endogenous regressor. More specifically, we opt for System GMM models that 
include both levels and differences equations, and employ lags in levels as instruments for 
differences and lags in differences as instruments for levels.15 When doing so, we follow standard 
practice and employ longer 5-year panels (taking moving averages for all variables). This is 
necessary for GMM models when time series are as extensive as ours, since only then can we 
avoid the problem of having too many instruments (Roodman 2009). Including too many 
instruments reduces the trustworthiness of the GMM estimates and the accompanying 
                                                
15 We follow standard practice and report System GMM rather than Difference GMM (“Arellano-Bond”) given the 
sluggish nature of LDI (see Blundell and Bond 1998 for simulations on the relative performance of System and 
Difference GMM models under different conditions). 
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specification tests. As a rule-of-thumb, the number of instruments should be lower than the 
number of cross-section units. 
In Model 9 we include only the first lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, and only 
LDI is treated as endogenous. (When multiple variables are treated as endogenous, we again 
quickly run into the problem of too many instruments, but see Models 11 and 12). Model 9 uses 
the second to fourth lags for instruments, and the instrument count (94) is well below the 
number of cross-section units (149). LDI remains significant at 5 percent, and the point estimate 
is 3.4. This suggests that the short-term effect of going from the minimum (0) to maximum 
observed (.83) score on LDI is about 2.8 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth. The 
estimated long-term effect (calculated as  LDI/(1- LDV) is only slightly higher, at 3.3 percentage 
points. The AR(2) test (p=.30) and Hansen J-test (p=.17) p-values are sufficiently high to suggest 
that Model 9 could yield a consistent estimate of the causal effect of local democracy on growth. 
As indicated by Models 10-12, this result is fairly robust to altering the GMM specification. 
In Model 10, a second lag of the dependent variable is added to Model 9, and the results and 
specification tests are basically unaltered. Model 11 alters Model 9 by also treating the lagged 
dependent variable as endogenous. This strengthens the LDI coefficient both in terms of size 
and significance (t=2.6), and further improves the Hansen J-test on the overidentification 
restrictions (p=.91). However, we note that the number of instruments exceeds the number of 
cross-section units in this specification. To alleviate this latter concern, we run Model 12, which 
now only uses the third and fourth lags for instrumentation, and the LDI coefficient remains 
stable and significant at 5 percent.  
In sum, the GMM results give us further reason to believe that we are actually tapping 
into a positive effect of local democracy on growth. We note that the usual caveats related to 
drawing strong causal inferences from national-level observational data apply, but to the extent 
that this is possible our tests corroborate the main hypothesis.   
 
V. Alternate Measures of Subnational Democracy 
Tests presented in Table 3 investigate whether omitting single indicators from our Local 
Democracy Index affects the result. To recap, LDI incorporates three indicators, capturing a) 
whether local officials are elected, b) the extent to which sub-national elections are free and fair, 
and c) the relative power of elected local officials vs. non-elected local officials. These indicators 
are multiplied, meaning that high levels of local democracy can only be ensured when there are 
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local elections, these elections allow for free and fair competition and the elected local officials 
are powerful relative to non-elected officials.  
 
Table 3:  Alternate measures 
 Baseline LDI disaggregated Alternate indices 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LDI 2.06**     2.51** 
 
2.09     2.34 
LDI w.o. free and fair elections  1.56*     
  1.93     
LDI w.o. relative power of elected offices   1.48*    
   1.84    
Subnational democracy index    1.87*   
    1.75   
Regional democracy index     1.42 -0.47 
     1.53 -0.49 
Ln GDP per capita -2.84*** -2.76*** -2.81*** -2.84*** -2.71*** -2.84*** 
 
-6.61 -6.80 -6.67 -6.54 -6.68 -6.51 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9231 9480 9190 9127 9515 9127 
Countries 149 149 149 148 150 148 
Max years 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.11 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured three years before dependent variable. Country dummies, year dummies and constant are 
omitted. 
 
While we clearly prefer this measure, one might question whether invoking evaluations of 
the freeness and fairness of elections introduces subjectivity bias in our measure. Others might 
question the relevance of including the relative power of elected officials in a measure of local 
democracy conceptualized in electoral terms. To ease comparisons, Model 1, Table 3 again 
reports the specification using the baseline LDI. Model 2, Table 3 replicates the benchmark with a 
reduced version of LDI omitting the free and fair elections term – this measure is equivalent to 
the official V-Dem Local Government Index (McMann 2016). Model 3 employs a reduced 
version of LDI omitting the relative power of elected officials. Results are slightly weakened 
when these less comprehensive measures are used in Models 2 and 3, but both models still 
display a weakly significant relationship with growth. In other words, our main result is not 
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driven entirely by the inclusion of evaluations of freeness or fairness of subnational elections or 
the relative power of elected and non-elected offices at the local level. But, accounting for both 
these features alongside the cornerstone indicator capturing whether there are local elections 
gives a clearer effect on growth. 
Finally, we noted how many studies in the decentralization literature have highlighted the 
regional (or state) level. One might expect that countries with high levels of local democracy also 
have high levels of “regional democracy”. Since V-Dem includes similar measures of elections 
and relative power of elected officials for the regional level, we first constructed a more 
comprehensive Subnational Democracy Index (SDI), closely corresponding to LDI in structure 
but weighting the local and regional levels equally (see Appendix A for details). We also 
constructed a Regional Democracy Index (RDI) with an identical structure to LDI. 
Model 4 shows that the relationship with growth is actually weakened when we substitute 
LDI with SDI, although SDI is significant at 10 percent. Model 5 reveals a fairly sizeable RDI 
coefficient, but the relationship between regional democracy and growth is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels (t=1.5). Model 6 jointly includes LDI and RDI, and only the 
former coefficient is now substantial in size (2.5) and statistically significant (t=2.3). Hence, our 
main result does not stem from democracy at the regional level (or national level, for that matter, 
as shown above) driving both local democracy and growth.  
 
VI. Contextual Effects 
Our argument suggests that the relationship between local democracy and growth should be 
stronger in particular contexts. We thus conduct tests on restricted samples to investigate 
whether or not the relationship between LDI and growth operates more strongly in some 
geographic regions of the world, in particular periods, and in countries with (national-level) 
political regimes that are classified as ‘democratic’ according to dichotomous measure from Boix 
et al. (2013). These tests allow us to assess the stability of the relationship across contexts, and, 
perhaps more interestingly, to further probe the validity of our argument.  
To recapitulate, we expect that local democracy should clearly matter for growth in 
contexts of national-level democracy, as the national government should be less likely to 
interfere with the workings of local level politics and provide more de facto autonomy for local 
officials to choose policies than in autocracies. Despite the literature on the workings of local 
elections in China and its implications for policy selection and growth, we were more skeptical 
that local democracy should matter in national-
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more easily be restricted in practice. This expectation is borne out in the data, as illustrated by 
contrasting Model 1 (democracies) with Model 2 (autocracies). In Model 1, LDI is 3.0 and 
statistically significant at 5 percent; in Model 2 LDI is 1.0 with a t-value of 0.4. This suggests that 
variation in local democracy matters for growth in countries that are fairly democratic at the 
national level, but we are not able to identify any clear effect in countries without competitive 
multi-party elections.16  
 
Table 4:  Split-sample tests 
Time-period Unrestricted Unrestricted 1900-1960 1900-1960 1960-2014 1960-2014 
Countries Democracies Autocracies Unrestricted Western Unrestricted Sub-Saharan Africa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LDI 2.95** 0.96 3.38* 6.39** 0.16 9.81* 
 
2.15 0.35 1.79 2.24 0.14 1.98 
Ln GDP per capita -4.97*** -3.21*** -8.02*** -13.65*** -3.53*** -3.91*** 
 
-6.94 -4.58 -4.07 -8.43 -6.99 -5.18 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3593 4548 3098 1138 6133 1896 
Countries 101 121 113 21 149 42 
Max years 107 100 60 60 48 48 
R2 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.10 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured three years before dependent variable. Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are 
omitted. 
 
Further, we hypothesized that local-level institutions should matter more in contexts 
where they, in general, have stronger leverage in terms of selecting various types of policies. This, 
for instance, means that we expect local democracy to make a greater difference in the early parts 
of the period that we study, before the development of comprehensive national-level legislation 
in many countries in areas such as welfare and education policies. Model 3 re-runs the baseline, 
but only for 1900-1959, and finds a large LDI coefficient (3.4) that is significant at 10 percent. 
Further tests show that this relationship, in the early part of the period, was particularly 
pronounced in “Western” countries (Western Europe plus Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
USA). Model 4 restricts the sample to only include Western countries for 1900-1959, and finds a 
                                                
16 We also note that the variance of LDI is about six times larger in the former sample than in the latter. Less 
variation in local democracy for autocracies makes it harder to identify an effect, even if there should be one. 
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very large LDI coefficient (6.4) that is significant at 5 percent. Going from the minimum 
observed (0.00) to the maximum observed (0.63) level of local democracy in this sample is 
predicted to increase annual GDP per capita growth by 4.0 percentage points. In contrast, there 
is no significant LDI coefficient on a global sample restricted to 1960 and after (see Model 5). We 
caution against interpreting this as clear evidence that local democracy does not relate to growth 
in the contemporary era. While the estimated effect is always lower in the post-1960 sample than 
the pre-1960 sample, plausible alternative specifications do show LDI coefficients that are 
statistically significant at conventional levels also for the recent period.17 
 However, the expectation on differences in effect over time for the global (and Western) 
samples was rooted in assumptions about the extent and scope of national-level policy-making 
and the room left for local units to select policies. This expectation should then also be 
applicable to contemporary contexts where the state is not the predominant unit in terms of 
setting policies. While there is variation between countries (Englebert 2002), Sub-Saharan Africa 
is often pointed out as a region where states are comparatively “weak”, and where local 
institutions truly matter for policy-making and various outcomes (e.g., Wig 2015). When we re-
run our baseline on post-1960 data for Sub-Saharan African countries (Model 6), LDI is even 
larger (9.8) than in the pre-1960 Western sample and has a t-value of 2.0.18 Going from the 
minimum (0.00) to maximum observed (0.45) LDI in the African sample is predicted to increase 
annual growth by 4.4 percentage points. In sum, local democracy clearly enhances growth in 
contexts where local institutions are presumed to be relatively important compared to state-level 
institutions.    
 
  
                                                
17 The difficulties for fixed effects specifications of picking up any existing relationship between a sluggish variable 
such as LDI and growth will be exacerbated for shorter time series, which might contribute to this non-robust result. 
Appendix Tables B.7 and B.8 report (fixed effects) models substituting year dummies with the cubic time trend and 
random effects specifications, respectively. LDI estimated on the post-1960 sample is significant at 1 percent in the 
former and 5 percent in the latter specification.  
18 In contrast, we do not find clear evidence that local democracy enhances growth in Asia, Latin America, or the 
Middle East. 
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VII. Conclusion 
We have argued that local democracy enhances economic growth by facilitating decentralized 
policymaking and by incentivizing local politicians to select policies that benefit development, 
including provision of local public goods. Using data from the V-Dem dataset, we tested the 
relationship between local democracy and growth on an extensive sample covering about 150 
countries and a time series extending from 1900 to the present. Whereas we do not find robust 
relationships for measures of decentralization or of national-level democracy, we do find robust 
evidence that local democracy predicts GDP per capita growth. This relationship holds when 
accounting for country- and year-fixed effects, in a variety of plausible specifications, and in 
GMM models that treat LDI as an endogenous regressor. Further tests reveal that, in accordance 
with our theory, the relationship is especially strong in (national-level) democracies, in the early 
decades of the twentieth century in Western countries, and in more recent decades in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Building on these findings, we suggest several avenues for future research. The first 
pertains to the causal mechanisms of our theory. In Section I, we identified policies commonly 
run by local governments that might affect growth performance. Data permitting, one might test 
the relationship between the character of local institutions and the adoption of alternate policies. 
(For an initial foray, focused on education policy, see Table B.1.) Second, one might interrogate 
prior causes. What are the determinants of local democracy? While the sources of national-level 
democracy (Coppedge 2012; Møller & Skaaning 2012) and decentralization (Arzaghi & 
Henderson 2005; Falleti 2010; Montero & Samuels 2004) have been extensively probed, the 
causes of local democracy are less well understood.  
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Appendix A:  Data and measures 
Local Democracy Index (LDI). This index is constructed by first re-scaling v2ellocelc, v2elffelr, and v2ellocpwr to range 
from 0-1, and then taking the product of these three indicators. 
Local Elections (v2ellocelc). Question: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice? 
The clarification in the V-Dem codebook states that “Government offices” here refers to a local executive and a local 
assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (e.g., a mayor). 
An assembly is a larger body of officials. “Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by 
a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are 
considered to be non-elected. In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of 
the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that 
election (however conducted) generally takes office.” The version of v2ellocelc that we employ follow the same procedure as 
McMann (2016) does when creating the V-Dem Local Government Index, in that the original V-Dem categories are first 
recoded so that 0=neither executive nor assembly is elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both 
elected. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
Local Elected Offices Relative Power (v2ellocpwr). Excerpt from the V-Dem codebook: “Question: How would 
you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and nonelected offices at the local level? Clarification: 
We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices relative to 
higher levels of government. Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not 
those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one 
office.) An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its 
decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office. 
Responses: 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level. 1: Some 
elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level. 2: Elected and non-elected offices are 
approximately equal in power at the local level. 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at 
the local level. 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. Ordering: 
Skip if previous question coded as “0” Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Cross-
coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model” Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
Free and Fair Subnational Elections (v2elffelr). Excerpt from the V-Dem codebook: “Question: Taking all 
aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider 
subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average? Clarification: This 
question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels 
without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this 
survey, choose option 5. “Free and fair” refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage 
(by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that 
issue separately). Responses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had 
little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for 
some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office). 2: 
Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant 
irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office). 3: 
Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end 
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affect the outcome (who won office). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions 
but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by 
the measurement model. Note: As of December 2014, the former category “5” is recoded as a separate variable 
(v2elffelrbin). Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model” Source: V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 2016). 
Ln GDP per capita (e_migdppcln). Real PPP-adjusted Gross domestic product per capita, transformed by the natural 
logarithm.  Source: Maddison Project (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). 
GDP per capita growth (e_migdpgro).  Annual growth rate of real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita.  Source: Maddison Project 
(Bolt and van Zanden 2014).    
Federalism (federalism_GT).  An institutionalized division or sharing of responsibilities between a national 
authority and semiautonomous regional units, usually codified in a constitution. 0=nonfederal (regional 
governments, if they exist, are granted minimal policy-making power), 1=semifederal (there are elective 
governments at the regional level but constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), 2=federal 
(elective regional governments plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority).  Rescaled from 0-1.  
Source: Gerring and Thacker (2008: 88).   
Revenue decentralization (Decentraliz_rev_EZ).  Subnational revenue as share of total public revenue.  Rescaled 
from 0-1.  Source: GFS, as compiled by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007).  
Polyarchy (v2x_polyarchy). The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the indices measuring 
freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de 
jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those 
indices. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
Polity 2 (e_polity2). A weighted additive aggregation procedure across five sub-components: competitiveness and openness of 
executive recruitment, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, and constraints on the chief executive.  Source: 
Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014). 
Democracy, Boix Miller, Rosato (e_boix_regime).  Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. 
Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of 
suffrage.  Source: Boix et al. (2013). 
Regional Democracy Index (RDI). This index is identically constructed as the Local Democracy Index, but 
substituting the indicators for Local Elections and Local Elected Offices Relative Power with the corresponding 
V-Dem variables for Regional Elections and Regional Elected Offices Relative Power. 
Subnational Democracy Index (SDI). This index follows the logic of the Local Democracy Index, but includes 
both regional and local democracy characteristics, which are weighted equally. The index is calculated as 
following: (½(Local Elections* Local Elected Offices Relative Power) + ½(Regional Elections* Regional Elected 
Offices Relative Power))* Free and Fair Subnational Elections. 
Ln Population (e_mipopula_ln) Total population, transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et 
al. 2016), constructed from data from CLIO Infra (clio-infra.eu). For this variable, V-Dem has interpolated missing data on the 
population count within a time-series using a linear model. 
Urbanization (e_miurbani).  Ratio of urban population to total population.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016), constructed 
from data from CLIO Infra (clio-infra.eu). 
Civil War (e_Civil_War). A dummy variable coded 1 if there was at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 
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battle deaths in a country-year, and 0 otherwise. Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011). 
Fuel income per capita (e_Total_Fuel_Income_P1000C). The measure is scaled so that it counts resource income 
for 1000 inhabitants rather than per inhabitant. Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011). 
Family farms (e_Vanhanen_familyfarm_ipo). What percentage of (cultivated) land area is comprised of family 
farms? Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016), providing a linearly interpolated version of the data originally taken from 
Vanhanen (2003). 
Average years of schooling, 25 year olds (bl_asy25mf). The variable is measured with 5-year intervals. Source: Barro 
and Lee (2013) 
Average years of schooling, 15 year olds (bl_asy15mf). The variable is measured with 5-year intervals. Source: Barro 
and Lee (2013) 
Average years of schooling, 25 year old females (bl_asy25f). The variable is measured with 5-year intervals. Source: 
Barro and Lee (2013) 
Average years of schooling, 15 year old females (bl_asy15f). The variable is measured with 5-year intervals. Source: 
Barro and Lee (2013) 
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Figure A.1: Histograms over LDI in year 1900, by major world regions  
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Figure A.2: Histograms over LDI in year 1950, by major world regions  
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Appendix B:  Additional tests 
Table B.1:   Baseline specifications, but with measures of education performance as 
dependent variable 
 
Avg. years schooling, 
25 year olds 
Avg. years schooling,  
15 year olds 
Avg. years schooling,  
25 year old females 
Avg. years schooling,  
15 year old females 
Local Dem. 0.89* 1.08* 0.73 0.89 1.24** 1.75*** 0.93* 1.27** 
 
1 .79 1.71 1.52 1.49 2.56 2.87 1.96 2.13 
Ln GDP pc 0.43** 0.42** 0.32** 0.31* 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 
 
2.44 2.34 1.99 1.92 3.68 3.63 3.01 2.95 
Polyarchy 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.52 -0.43 -1.22 -0.81 
Country dum. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dum. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1187 1170 1187 1170 1187 1170 1187 1170 
Countries 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
TS  (for DV) 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 1950-2010 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. Dependent variable is taken from the Barro and Lee dataset (Barro 
and Lee 2013), and is reported in 5-year intervals. Hence, the time series unit is 5-year panel, with all independent variables 
averaged over a 5-year period. All independent variables are lagged by one 5-year period in all models. Country dummies, year 
dummies, and constant are omitted 
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Table B.2:   Horse race tests using alternative measures of decentralization and of 
national-level democracy 
 Horse races with decentralization measures Horse races with national-level democracy measures 
LDI 2.73* 3.07* -1.04 -1.54 3.41*** 3.91*** 3.38*** 4.00*** 
 1 .73 1.81 -0 .57 -0 .83 3.21 3.58 3.15 3.61 
Federalism 0.35 0.22 
       1.23 0.76 
Fiscal Decentr. 
  
0.03 0.04 
     1.26 1.41 
Polity 2 
    
-0.05* -0.03 
   -1.93 -1.15 
BMR 
      
-0.68** -0.51* 
 -2.43 -1.80 
Ln GDP p.c. -3.97*** -4.49*** -6.46*** -6.95*** -3.14*** -3.47*** -3.18*** -3.59*** 
 -6.29 -6.87 -4.08 -4.42 -7.15 -8.08 -7.33 -8.4 
Country dum. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 Cubic time trend  Y  Y  Y  Y 
N 4693 4693 1260 1260 8266 8266 8141 8141 
R2 0.14 0.04 0.1 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured in t-3. Country dummies, year dummies, time trend polynomials, and constant are omitted 
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Table B.3:   Benchmark specification including different lags of the dependent variable 
to account for persistence of economic growth (Note that dependent variable always 
measured in t+3, as in benchmark) 
 Baseline Alternative specific. incl. various lags of the DV (growth in t+3) 
LDI (t) 2.06** 1.54* 1.91** 1.94** 1.97** 1.52* 
 
2 .09 1.84 2.04 2.03 2.08 1.84 
Ln GDP p.c. (t) -2.84*** -2.39*** -2.75*** -2.67*** -2.79*** -2.37*** 
 
-6.61 -6.20 -6.8 -6.60 -6.84 -6.52 
DV in t+2 
 
0.12*** 
   
0.11*** 
 
4.20 3.77 
DV in t+1 
 
0.04** 
   
0.03 
 
1.99 1.60 
DV in t 
 
0.03* 0.04** 
  
0.03 
 
1.84 2.40 1.60 
DV in t-1 
  
0.02* 0.03** 0.02* 0.02 
 
1.72 2.08 1.73 1.24 
DV in t-2 
  
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.45 -0.37 -0.47 -0.61 
DV in t-3 
    
0.01 
 
 
0.57 
DV in t-4 
    
0.01 
 
 
0.67 
DV in t-5 
    
0.01 
 
 
0.87 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9231 9126 8920 8920 8604 8920 
R2 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are omitted. IV= Independent variables. 
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Table B.4:   Including alternative sets of control variables 
 Baseline Alternative sets of control variables 
LDI 2.06** 1.77* 2.24** 2.33** 2.18** 3.29*** 3.21** 
 
2 .09 1.77 2.30 2.23 2.06 2.79 2.34 
Ln GDP per capita -2.84*** -3.09*** -2.69*** -3.20*** -2.93*** -3.76*** -4.54*** 
 
-6.61 -6.16 -6.16 -7.62 -6.66 -7.02 -6.40 
Ln Population 
 
-1.64*** 
    
-1.81*** 
 
-3.26 -3.23 
Urbanization 
  
-2.18 
   
0.28 
 
-0.91 0.10 
Civil War 
   
-1.38*** 
  
-1.10*** 
 
-3.00 -2.67 
Fuel income per thousand cap 
    
-0.33** 
 
-0.04 
 
-2.10 -0.17 
Family farms 
     
0.01 0.01 
 
0.56 1.03 
Polyarchy 
      
-2.69*** 
 
-1.86 
Federalism 
      
0.22 
 
0.62 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9231 8952 8952 8208 8192 6441 3744 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.16 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured in t-3. Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are omitted 
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Table B.5:   Different lag-lengths on independent variables 
Ind. var. measured in t+3 (baseline) t+2 t+4 t+8 t t-1 t-3 
LDI 2.06** 2.65** 1.71* 1.46* 0.31 -1.01 -1.87** 
 
2.09 2.57 1.75 1.84 0.31 -1.11 -2.30 
Ln GDP p.c. -2.84*** -2.86*** -2.84*** -2.58*** 1.95*** 2.77*** 3.50*** 
 
-6.61 -6.31 -6.50 -7.20 6.54 8.48 9.91 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9231 9391 9073 8448 9611 9506 9301 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are omitted 
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Table B.6:   Granger-type tests 
Dependent variable: GDP per  cap i ta  growth LDI 
DV measured in: t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
LDI (measured in t) 2.81*** 2.60*** 1.96** 0.80*** 0.84*** 0.88*** 
 
2.89 2.82 2.05 39.82 49.50 63.58 
GDP p.c. growth (measured in t) 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 
5.46 4.51 2.96 -2.24 -2.18 -2.5 
Ln GDP p.c. (measured in t) -2.58*** -2.71*** -2.81*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 
-6.64 -6.64 -6.53 1.69 1.61 1.35 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9448 9287 9126 9249 9402 9488 
R2 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.77 0.81 0.85 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are omitted 
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Table B.7:   Split-sample tests with cubic time trend 
Time-period Unrestricted Unrestricted 1900-1960 1900-1960 1960-2014 1960-2014 
Countries Democracies Autocracies Unrestricted Western Unrestricted Sub-Saharan Africa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LDI 2.66*** -0.37 2.63** 6.31*** 1.97** 7.20* 
 
2.88 -0.21 2.39 3.97 2.35 1.74 
Ln GDP per capita -0.42* 0.16 -0.69** -3.63*** -0.33* -0.50 
 -1.69 0.75 -2.43 -5.51 -1.89 -1.36 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cubic time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3593 4548 3098 1138 6133 1896 
Countries 101 121 113 21 149 42 
Max years 107 100 60 60 48 48 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are (fixed 
effects) OLS models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured three years before dependent variable. Country dummies, year dummies, and constant are 
omitted. 
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Table B.8:   Split-sample tests in Random Effects models 
Time-period Unrestricted Unrestricted 1900-1960 1900-1960 1960-2014 1960-2014 
Countries Democracies Autocracies Unrestricted Western Unrestricted Sub-Saharan Africa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LDI 4.92*** 3.19 3.20*** 7.64*** 2.40*** 8.06** 
 
4.33 1.42 2.78 4.48 2.77 2.00 
Ln GDP per capita -1.39*** -0.58** -0.86*** -4.33*** -0.53*** -0.72* 
 
-4.83 -2.23 -2.89 -5.51 -2.89 -1.77 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3593 4548 3098 1138 6133 1896 
Countries 101 121 113 21 149 42 
Max years 107 100 60 60 48 48 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. T-stats are reported directly below regression coefficients in italics. All models are 
Random Effects models with robust errors clustered by country. GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable in all models. 
Independent variables are measured three years before dependent variable. Year dummies and constant are omitted. 
 
